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SPORTS FACILITIES, REDEVELOPMENT,
AND THE CENTRALITY OF
DOWNTOWN AREAS: OBSERVATIONS
AND LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCES IN A
RUSTBELT AND SUNBELT CITY
MARK S. ROSENTRAUB*
I. INTRODUCTION
The engines of wealth and economic activity for cities have changed.
In the past, center cities were manufacturing, industrial, retail, and ser-
vice centers. Today, while industrial output is still important for the eco-
nomic health of some cities, consumption, recreation, tourism, and the
provision of services are now the principal engines of urban wealth.' In-
surance, banking, legal and financial services joined with experiential
consumption, traditional retailing, and various forms of entertainment
define the new focus for core cities that try to maintain their centrality in
a regional economy.
This transformation has been continental in scope, as center cities
have dedicated substantial amounts of their urban space to these activi-
ties. Rustbelt cities once mired in the deep recessions of the 1970s and
1980s have capitalized on the national economic expansion of the 1990s
and built luxurious recreation facilities and retail centers to complement
the downtown office buildings that serve as home to service industries.
Sunbelt areas, once content to accept or encourage suburbanization,
now also emphasize center city redevelopment with a focus on recrea-
tion, tourism, consumption, and services. Festival marketplaces, malls,
convention centers, arenas, ballparks, and football stadia now define
downtown areas from Toronto to Houston and Baltimore to San Diego.
This is not to suggest that suburban areas have lost their luster as a loca-
tion for residences and businesses. However, three unique elements of
the current economic expansion have generated important opportunities
which center cities have used in an effort to thwart suburbanization and
sprawl.
* Professor and Associate Dean, School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana
University Indianapolis.
1. See Tim ToumsT CrrY (Dennis R. Judd & Susan S. Fainstein eds., 1999).
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First, every period with extensive economic growth has engendered a
consumption binge. While luxury items are still popular, the wealth cre-
ated in the 1990s has led to an interest in "experiential" consumption.
What one experiences or enjoys in the act of consumption has assumed a
level of importance at least equal to the value of tangible goods. Exam-
ples of experiential consumption include luxury seating at sporting
events, coffee bars at bookstores, and rock climbing walls in sporting
goods stores. Some might suggest that experience has always been a
main element for consumption.2 Regardless of when experiences be-
came an integral element of consumption and the economy, cities have
capitalized on the importance of experience and entertainment in con-
sumption by providing the space in which these unique opportunities can
occur.
3
Second, the recent economic expansion has led to an exponential
growth in tourism. Tourists need central places to both visit and secure
housing and meals and cities have met this need through an emphasis on
unique physical features and the construction of edifices for identity and
visitation.4 The needed hotels and restaurants cluster about the facilities
designed specifically to attract tourists. The growth of tourism and expe-
riential consumption has made this sector of the economy larger than the
industrial sector in the U. S.5
Third, the aging of the baby-boom generation has created a pool of
two-person households with the resources to consume the recreational
experiences now available in cities and many elect to live in downtown
areas closer to experiential amenities.
Sports has been a centerpiece for many downtown redevelopment
efforts. Sporting events fit or define the current experiential element of
consumption. Competitive games offer fans a unique experience (each
game is different) and with the advent of luxury seating there is an op-
portunity for people to consume sports in an elite and rarified manner
visible to other consumers. There is then an experiential and conspicu-
ous consumption component to sports. Some sporting events, including
championships and the Olympics, also have the potential for attracting a
large number of visitors to a city creating the potential for redefining a
downtown area as a tourist destination.
2. See B. JOSEPH PINE II & JAMES H. GILMORE, TiE EXPERIENCE ECONOMY (1999).
3. See MICHAEL J. WOLF, Trm ENTERTAINMENT ECONOMY (1999).
4. See Briavel Holcomb, Marketing Cities for Tourism, in TiE TouiST Crry supra note 1,
at 54.
5. See PINE II & GILMORE, supra note 2; WOLF, supra note 3.
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These trends or factors have led to a redefinition of urban landscapes
to include new arenas, ballparks, or stadia. Mayors from rustbelt cities
such as Baltimore, Buffalo, Cleveland, Indianapolis, and Washington, D.
C. can point to new downtown sports facilities, as can elected officials
from the Sunbelt's Atlanta, Dallas, Miami, Los Angeles, Phoenix, San
Diego, and Seattle. In several of these areas the new facilities are con-
sidered signature statements, defining elements of the city's identity, or
the catalysts for redevelopment efforts. Oriole Park at Camden Yards
(Baltimore), "The Jake" (Jacobs Field, Cleveland), the Ballpark at Ar-
lington (Texas), the Fieldhouse (Conseco Fieldhouse, Indianapolis), and
the BOB (Bank One Ballpark, Phoenix) have indeed assumed a level of
civic identity, pride, and importance for residents.
Other articles in this symposium focus on the economic importance
of teams and the facilities they use. Those pieces, as well as other re-
search, underscores the very limited ability of sports development strate-
gies, individual facilities, or the presence of teams to engender economic
development.6 This article, however, focuses on the concentration of
sports facilities in downtown areas and asks two questions: First, does
the presence of sports facilities change the image of downtown areas?
Second, do downtown sports facilities redistribute economic activity al-
lowing core areas to remain vital components of their region's economy?
Numerous researchers have urged city officials to judiciously ex-
amine all calls for the use of tax money to pay for sports facilities. Nev-
ertheless, attracted to the perceived value of outcomes in some areas,
the interest in spending tax dollars for arenas, ballparks, and stadiums
has not abated. State and local governments have already spent more
than $10 billion for sports facilities.7 A stream of projects involving
other major and minor league franchises and college teams will substan-
tially increase this number across the next few years.8 Given this on-
going interest in utilizing sports to underscore the centrality of down-
town areas, this paper presents a typology of efforts in large and small
urban regions. The analysis of the potential impacts of the different
strategies in the typology is designed to highlight the potential outcomes
for a community from the presence of a sports team or special events
such as an Olympics, Super Bowl, or collegiate national championship
event. Attention is then directed towards the experiences of two cities,
6. See Mark S. Rosentraub et al., Sports and Downtown Development Strategy: If You
Build It Will They Come? 16 J. URn. AF. 221 (1994); MARK S. ROSENTRAUB, MAJOR
LEAGUE LOsERs: THE REAL CosTs OF SPORTS AND WHO'S IS PAYING FOR IT (1999).
7. See JOANNA CAGAN & NEr DEMAusE, FIELD OF Scr mES ix (1998).
8. See JAMES QuIRx & RODNEY FORT, HARD BALL 147-148, 218-225 (1999).
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Indianapolis and Phoenix, that have used sports as a catalyst for down-
town redevelopment. An assessment of what these cities gained or did
not gain will help other cities evaluate sports as a redevelopment tool.
I. SPORTS, ENTERTAINMENT, AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT:
A TYPOLOGY OF EFFORTS
The focus on entertainment and consumption for an urban renais-
sance began in the late 1970s and early 1980s with the Rouse Corpora-
tion's development of the Harborplace complex in Baltimore and
Faneuil Hall Marketplace in Boston. The success of these projects con-
vinced numerous other cities to develop festival marketplaces in historic
buildings. While few, if any, of these efforts were as successful as the
projects in Baltimore and Boston, they did highlight the potential for
recreation, entertainment, and retail consumption as a redevelopment
strategy.
Indianapolis then took the next and larger step of tying sports to this
concept with its amateur and professional sports strategy for redevelop-
ing its downtown center. Indianapolis was the first city to create a sports
commission to attract national and international athletic events and or-
ganizations to the downtown area. The city's sports strategy became a
policy theme uniting a business and government regime in a twenty-five
year effort to rebuild a deteriorating downtown area. Indianapolis's suc-
cess in attracting national and international sporting events encouraged
many cities to create sports commissions. Today hundreds of such com-
missions are part of the governance of urban areas and virtually every
city has tried to tie elements of the success of the Rouse Corporation
and their retail complexes with a sports strategy reflecting outcomes in
Indianapolis.
A. Redevelopment Program Goals
There are essentially two goals for redevelopment programs focused
on recreation, entertainment, retail consumption, and service industries.
The "internal goal" is to redirect or concentrate regional spending into a
downtown area. This movement of economic activity from more subur-
ban locations does not generate economic development, but it does con-
centrate activity and can enliven a declining downtown region.
The "external" goal for sports and entertainment redevelopment pro-
grams is to attract new spending as a result of the attraction of tourists
and visitors from outside of the region. All redevelopment plans also
seek "an export component" or new dollars for an economy that can
complement the redistribution of regional spending for recreational ac-
[Vol. 10:219
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tivities. National and international championships or other very special
events also have the potential to retain local spending by residents who
in the absence of these opportunities might have attended events in
other areas. This retention of dollars also represents real economic de-
velopment. Table 1 describes the redevelopment programs and various
combinations of emphases on sports, entertainment, and services.9
The internal goal of all redevelopment programs, regardless of the
emphases selected, is to concentrate a level of spending for consumptive
services in a declining downtown area. The particular emphasis selected
as the cornerstone for a redevelopment policy is also expected to attract
tourists and new visitors to establish an export component for the plan.
Many implemented plans fail to achieve this goal.
Each redevelopment program has two components: sports and an al-
lied effort. The allied effort can include up to four sub-components. The
sports element can range from an effort organized to attract or retain a
single team to an entire sports strategy. Jacksonville, Sacramento, Hart-
ford, and Birmingham are representative of communities that focused
their efforts on a single team for a redevelopment effort. Hartford and
Birmingham have yet to secure the teams they want (NFL franchises).
Jacksonville has used its NFL team as an anchor to redefine its image,
and Sacramento has utilized its NBA franchise to establish itself as more
than a governmental center. There are a number of cities (Buffalo,
Cleveland, Dallas, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Nashville, Phoenix, and St.
Louis) with two team strategies. Redevelopment efforts in these cities
have included an arena for a basketball or hockey team that becomes a
venue for concerts and other indoor events. Virtually all sports strate-
gies also involve the building of new facilities for teams. Phoenix and
Cleveland are prime examples of cities that utilized sports as corner-
stones for redevelopment, but only Indianapolis focused on both export-
based amateur sports championship events and professional sports
teams. Indianapolis has also emphasized conventions as part of its ex-
port-based strategy for redevelopment. 10
The value in classifying a city's redevelopment plan according to the
cells in Table 1 involves the assessment of potential for real economic
development as opposed to the redistribution of existing regional spend-
ing patterns. This is essential for understanding the value or economic
return from a redevelopment program and whether or not the appropri-
9. See infra Table 1.
10. See WuiLL'M H. HuDmuT III, THE HuDur YEAS nN IiANAPous: 1976-1991
(1995).
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ate tool for evaluating success should be the intangible benefits of an
improved image for a city. Plans that focus only on professional sports
teams have less potential for generating regional economic development
than do other emphases that bring visitors from other regions and na-
tions to a city.
The overwhelming majority of fans attending games played by pro-
fessional teams are residents of the area or people who already rely on
the region for their recreational consumption. As a result, their spend-
ing would have likely occurred even if the teams did not exist. When
fans cannot attend games they go to the movies, shows, and restaurants,
and the same dollars spent at the ballpark, stadium, or arena are thus
spent in a region's economy. The spending on sports instead of some
other form of recreation is usually identified as a substitution effect-
consumers substitute one form of recreation for another. There are
some teams and events that attract fans from outside of a region. How-
ever, the question that must be asked is whether these visitors attending
games would still have come to Denver, Phoenix, or Indianapolis for
their recreation? The recreational market base for an urban area is
larger than a city or its adjacent counties. People from rural areas have
relied on larger urban areas for their consumption activities for decades,
and the presence or absence of any one team will not alter this relation-
ship. To be sure a team should have a positive effect on the number of
visits that occur and reduce the number of visits to other cities made by
residents of a region. In that sense, a team does indeed have a positive
effect on economic development.11 However, the vast majority of spend-
ing that takes place at sporting events is merely a substitution of one
form of consumption that would have occurred within a region for an-
other form. To that extent there is no real economic development
although it may well be quite important to have that spending occur in a
downtown area.
The issue of real economic development for a region is complicated
or confused given the multiplicity of cities in a region. For example,
when the Los Angeles Lakers and Kings moved from The Forum in In-
glewood to the Staples Center in downtown Los Angeles, there was no
change or increment to the region's economy. However, there was a
gain for the City of Los Angeles and at least a temporary loss for In-
glewood. The loss for Inglewood is temporary as the land vacated by the
11. See David Swindell & Mark S. Rosentraub, Who Benefits from the Presence of Profes-
sional Sports Teams? The Implications for Public Funding of Stadiums and Arenas, 58 PUB.
ADMIn. REv. 11 (1998).
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teams may be used for other purposes. The land for the arena in down-
town Los Angeles had been vacant or abandoned for decades. As such,
the gain for Los Angeles was real even though the region was unaf-
fected. It is perfectly acceptable to note that there has been economic
development for one city while there has been no gain for a region. The
use of tax money, however, to simply move economic activity generates
no real tangible benefits and it is important that this point be
underscored.
The realization that sports, entertainment, and consumption spend-
ing may create little real economic development for a region explains the
importance and interest placed on the second dimension of allied pro-
grams. The emphasis of this second dimension of redevelopment plans is
usually on the export component. Conventions are an important source
of new spending and real development as these events frequently attract
large numbers of visitors to a city. The emphasis on conventions by
many cities has led to the building of numerous centers. It may not be
possible for all of these various centers to be successful. There are now
more than 430 convention centers in the United States.' 2
Service businesses that locate in a downtown area are a source of real
economic growth. Successful businesses provide services and products
to residents of other regions and countries. As a result, cities have en-
couraged the building of downtown office complexes in the hope of at-
tracting and retaining large firms. Complementing the expansion in
recreation, retail, entertainment, convention centers, and office buildings
has been an explosion in the number of hotel rooms available in down-
town areas. The goal of these elements in the redevelopment process
has been to enhance the export function and increase the real economic
development that occurs for a region.
Returning to Table 1, to the extent that a redevelopment program
can include elements under the categories "conventions," "service busi-
nesses," and "sports strategies," the more likely a redevelopment pro-
gram will engender economic development. To the extent that single or
multiple teams and entertainment are emphasized, it is likely that the
economic activity taking place is merely a substitution of one form of
recreational consumption for another. This substitution of downtown-
based experiential recreation can still produce an enhanced image for a
downtown or inner city area, however substitution effects are incapable
of producing real economic development for a region.
12. See Dennis R. Judd, Constructing the Tourist Bubble, in TmE ToI msT CrrY supra note
1, at 35, 40.
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Finally, in assessing changing growth and development levels, relative
shifts may be the most important factor to consider. In an expanding
economy one is likely to find real growth taking place in downtown and
suburban areas. If a change in patterns were actually taking place, one
would expect to find the concentration of activity shifting from suburban
to inner city areas or from downtown areas to the suburbs. If all areas
are improving at the same rate there may be change in the relative con-
centration of economic activity or the centrality of one area.
III. SPORTS, ENTERTAINMENT, AND DOWNTOWN REDEVELOPMENT:
A TALE OF Two Crrms
A. Why Sports and Downtown Development?
The Challenge for Two Cities
Despite extreme differences in location, similar factors drove the em-
phases on downtown development in both Indianapolis and Phoenix.
Both cities desired different and more dynamic national images.
Through the 1960s, the best that could be said for Indianapolis's image
and its downtown area is that it had no reputation or presence in the
national consciousness. 13 Phoenix enjoyed a reputation as a fine winter
resort, but it did not have an image as a dynamic business and residential
center until the 1980s. By then, the City of Phoenix was suffering from
the same fate that confronted Indianapolis in the 1970s and 1980s. Both
center cities were becoming smaller parts of their metropolitan areas and
each had a deteriorating or neglected downtown core area.
In 1970, two-thirds of the metropolitan region's 1.1 million people
lived within the consolidated city of Indianapolis. By 1980, just 53.7% of
the region's population lived in Indianapolis. Indianapolis had expanded
its boundaries through a consolidation with its neighboring suburban ar-
eas in the 1960s, but this was not sufficient to thwart the outflow of resi-
dents. Phoenix, despite being at the center of extraordinary regional
growth was also shrinking in terms of the proportion of the region's resi-
dents living within the city.
As detailed in Table 2, Phoenix's share of Maricopa County's popula-
tion has been steadily declining since 1960.14 By 1998, slightly more than
two-fifths of the county's population was concentrated in the city of
Phoenix. In 1960, more than two-thirds of the county's population lived
in Phoenix. With the growth of the region since 1990 (a 22.7% increase
13. See HUDNtT, supra note 10.
14. See infra Table 2.
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to 2.75 million in 1996) Phoenix was becoming a smaller part of the met-
ropolitan area. Both Indianapolis and Phoenix, despite locations in two
very different parts of the United States, faced a challenge to underscore
the role of the center city and its downtown area in the life and economy
of their regions. Both cities turned to recreational experiences anchored
by sports to change the image of the central city and its downtown area.
B. Indianapolis's Sports Strategy
From 1974 to 1999 more than $3 billion was spent on new construc-
tion projects as a result of the sports strategy.' Eliminated from this
tabulation were projects that would have taken place even if no specific
strategy existed. More than one-third of these dollars, 35.2%, or $1.6
billion, were specifically related to the "experience economy"-sports
and entertainment facilities and hotels. Residential construction, a di-
rect result of the redevelopment of downtown, accounted for another
$60 million in new development with numerous other projects underway.
C. Phoenix's Downtown Redevelopment Strategy
While less robust and taking place over a shorter period of time, al-
most $2 billion in new development has taken place in downtown Phoe-
nix.16 The public sector has also had to play a more pronounced role in
Phoenix. For example, in Indianapolis local governments spent 17.5% of
the total funds invested in redevelopment projects (including tax abate-
ments). By contrast, in Phoenix, the county and the city were responsi-
ble for 27.5% of the funds used for redevelopment projects excluding
abatements. In both communities, however, city governments were able
to leverage a substantial level of private sector funds through their com-
mitments to fund recreation facilities and complete an effort to rede-
velop and redefine the downtown areas.
The attraction of recreation and service industries to Indianapolis's
downtown area (through the development of office buildings and other
facilities) also led to the building of several hotels. In 1996, for example,
there were 3,557 rooms in downtown Indianapolis. Construction under-
way in 1999 will lead to the existence of 5,225 rooms by 2001. Down-
town Phoenix also saw the building of several new hotels to satisfy the
needs of both the recreation and service industries.
15. See infra Table 3.
16. See infra Table 4.
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IV. MEASURING SUCCESS IN INDIANAPOLIS AND PHOENIX
Relative to rebuilding downtown Indianapolis and establishing a new
and different image for the city, the sports emphasis and focus on down-
town did indeed achieve an important measure of success. By the 1990s
the city had been home to numerous events including the 1987 Pan
American Games, the Final Four of the NCAA Men's Basketball Tour-
nament (four times), and several international competitions. In terms of
the city's identity and reputation there was probably no better measure
of the success of the downtown and sports redevelopment program than
Indianapolis's second place finish to Philadelphia in a bid to host the
2000 Republican National Convention. Indianapolis's ability to compete
for that prestigious convention described how far the city had come in
redefining its image and recreating its downtown area as a center for
entertainment and consumption.
By other measures of success the program's accomplishments were
less stellar. In 1977 among a group of Midwestern areas, Indianapolis
had the second highest average income or wage level. In 1989, Indianap-
olis had declined to fifth position while at the regional level the Indian-
apolis region was second in 1977 and fourth in 1989.17 By 1996, the
Indianapolis region was ranked third relative to the concentration of
households with disposable income above $75,000.18
In terms of the location of jobs, the sports strategy has not reversed
the long-standing suburbanization in the region. In 1985, 18% of the
regions' jobs were located in downtown Indianapolis; in 1995, the
number of jobs in downtown Indianapolis accounted for 14.8% of the
region's opportunities. From 1985 to 1995 there was actually an increase
of 3,239 jobs in the downtown area; the region, however, enjoyed more
robust growth accounting for the reduction in the centrality of the core
area.
19
Phoenix's downtown area, like Indianapolis's core area, is now a des-
tination for recreation and tourism. In addition, a number of businesses
have moved to or expanded their offices in downtown Phoenix. Down-
town Phoenix has indeed shed its image of a core area largely aban-
doned after the workday and declining in overall importance.
This change in the image of downtown Phoenix has not produced the
level of economic development or change that many had anticipated.
17. See MARK S. ROSENTRAUB, MAJOR LEAGUE LOSERS, supra note 6, at 225.
18. See infra Table 5.
19. See Mark S. Rosentraub, Stadiums and Urban Space, in SPORTS, JOBS AND TAXES 178
(Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997).
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One measure of economic development is reflected by the taxes col-
lected by the city of Phoenix from restaurants, hotels, and retail outlets.
If downtown Phoenix had now become the engine or center of recrea-
tion and entertainment for the region, one would expect to find both a
growing level of tax revenues and an increasing proportion of these taxes
concentrated in the downtown area. Table 6 illustrates that there has
indeed been a very large increase in the scale of business in the down-
town area as reflected in the increasing levels of taxes collected from
establishments in that area.
However, when these increases are compared with the changes in
business activity throughout Phoenix, the increases or changes become
less obvious. In 1991, 1.8% of all of the sales taxes collected in Phoenix
came from businesses in the downtown area. In 1998, after the opening
of the Bank One Ballpark and the completion of several other projects,
the downtown area was generating but 2.1% of the city's sales tax
dollars.20
V. CONCLUSIONS
Indianapolis and Phoenix have changed the images of their down-
town areas, and that was an important objective of their redevelopment
policies. Both downtown areas are now recreational destinations provid-
ing important experiences for consumers. However, the economic
objectives of the sports policies have been far less successful in terms of
underscoring the centrality of downtown areas. The level of business
activity in downtown Phoenix, as measured by sales tax dollars collected,
has remained relatively unchanged. In 1991, 1.8% of the city's sales tax
dollars were produced by the downtown area. This level remained rela-
tively static until the Arizona Diamondbacks began play in the Bank
One Ballpark. The spending by the approximately three million at-
tendees of games and events at the ballpark increased the downtown
area's share of the city's sales tax to 2.1%. The overwhelming propor-
tion of the city's sales tax earnings occurs outside of the downtown area.
Indianapolis's sports and redevelopment policies, dedicated as they
were to export-based activities, still could demonstrate but modest eco-
nomic success as measured either by wage levels or the concentration of
regional economic activity in the downtown area. Compared to other
areas in the Midwest with which the city competes, the city actually de-
dined from its ranking as having the second highest wage rate in 1977.
20. See infra Table 7.
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This decline has held consistent through 1996. While the change was
slight, from second to third on one measure, the focus on sports did not
attract the high paying jobs that some believed would be forthcoming as
the downtown area flourished. There was an increase in the number of
jobs in the downtown area, but growth in the region led to an actual
decline in the proportion of employment opportunities in downtown
Indianapolis.
The sports strategies followed by Phoenix and Indianapolis did en-
hance the images of downtown areas and insure that there will be a con-
tinuing level of economic activity in this area. In neither city has the
sports strategy produced a downtown area that dominates in its region.
In both regions, during periods of growth, the downtown areas did grow,
but not as quickly as other parts of the metropolitan regions. The best
that can be said is that the entertainment focus through sports has
slowed increased suburbanization. The policies, however, have not re-
versed the trend towards suburbanization or brought high paying jobs to
the area. Both cities and their counties spent large amounts of tax dol-
lars to insure that a proportion of the region's growth would take place
in the respective downtown areas. In the absence of these subsidies,
some of the development that took place in downtown Phoenix or down-
town Indianapolis would have occurred elsewhere in those metropolitan
regions. It now remains for those taxpayers to decide if what they re-
ceived in terms of more vibrant downtown center was worth their
commitments.
The lessons for other cities to be learned from the outcomes in Phoe-
nix and Indianapolis is that a focus on sports and entertainment will not
reverse suburbanization or lead to the attraction of high paying jobs for
the economy. The focus on fun and sports may help insure a role for a
downtown area in a regional economy, but real economic development
transforming the economic space of a region is not to be found in the
building of ballparks, stadiums, and arenas. If a city is interested in slow-
ing suburbanizing trends, sports may well be an asset. The issue in every
instance, however, is the cost to achieve this outcome relative to the
modest gains observed for both Phoenix and Indianapolis and the other
potential strategies that may have far greater success in revitalizing cit-
ies, their downtown areas, and urban life.
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TABLE 1: A TYPOLOGY OF SPORTS AND RELATED
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
Sports Element Allied Development Efforts
Retail/ Service
Entertainment Consumption Conventions Businesses
Single Team
Multiple Teams
New Facilities
Sports Strategy
TABLE 2: POPULATION CONCENTRATIONS IN MARICOPA COUNTY,
1960-1998
Year Maricopa County Percent Change Phoenix Percent of County
1960
1970
1980
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
663,510
967,522
1,509,052
2,122,101
2,169,163
2,216,175
2,274,394
2,358,014
2,526,113
2,611,327
2,699,098
2,784,075
439,170
581,562
789,704
991,711
1,011,757
1,036,760
1.063,864
1,099,359
1,136,157
1,160,634
1,184,353
1,198,064
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TABLE 3: PROJECTS AND SOURCES OF FUNDS FOR DOWNTOWN
DEVELOPMENT IN INDIANAPOLIS 2 '
(IN $MILLIONS)
Projects Year Source of Funds Total
Federal State City Private Philanthropic
Market Square Arena
Children's Museum
Hyatt Hotel/Bank
Sports Center
Indiana Theater
Capitol Tunnel
IU Track and Field Stadium
IU Natatorium
Velodrome
2 W. Washington Offices
1 N. Capitol Offices
Hoosier Dome
Lower Canal Apartments
Heliport
Walker Building
Embassy Suite Hotel
Lockerbie Market
Union Station
City Market
Pan Am Plaza
Lockfield Apartments
Canal Overlook Apartments
1974 0
1976 0
1977 0
1979 0
1980 1.5
1982 1.4
1982 0
1982 1.5
1982 0.5
1982 1.2
1982 3.2
1984 0
1985 7.9
1985 2.5
1985 2.0
1985 6.45
1986 1.8
1986 16.3
1986 0
1987 0
1987 0
1988 0
Zoo 1988
Nat'l Institute of Sports 1988
Eiteljorg Museum 1989
Westin Hotel 1989
Indiana University 75-90
Farm Bureau 1992
State Office Center 1992
Lilly Corporate Expansion 1992
Circle Centre Mal 22  1995
Other Projects 74-98
Property Tax Abatements 74-98
Victory Field 1997
Conseco Fieldhouse 1999
USA Funds
RCA Dome Improvements 1999
NCAA Headquarters 1999
New Hotels 1999
Convention Center Additions 1999
TOTAL
PERCENT
0
0
0
0.5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 16.0
0 0
0 0
0 4.0
0 0
0 0
1.9 0
7.0 0
0 1.1
0 0
0 0
0 48.0
0 10.3
0.1 0.6
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 1
0 0
0 5.7
0 0.6
0 0
0 0
3.0 3.0
0 0
0 0
231.0 0
0 0
264.0 0
0 0
0 290.0
0 0
0
0
55.0
1.5
4.5
0
0
0
0
11.8
10.4
0
0
2.4
0
25.0
14.0
36.0
0
25.0
24.6
11.0
0
0
0
65.0
0
0
0
242
0
1,066.9
0 98.0 0
5.0 9.0 9.0
38.0 71.0 69.0
16.6
20.0
100.0
46.7 555.0 578.3 1,
1.4 16.8 17.5
70.0
100.0
25.0 25.0
689.8 428.7
51.2 13.0
16.0
25.0
55.0
7.0
6.0
1.4
5.9
21.5
2.7
13.0
13.6
78.0
20.2
5.6
3.4
31.5
15.8
53.3
4.7
35.2
25.2
11.0
37.5
9.0
60.0
65.5
231.0
36.0
264.0
242.0
300.0
1,066.9
98.0
23.0
178.0
20.0
75.0
3,298.5
100
21. DEP'T METROPOLITAN DEV., CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS
22. This is the present value of the city's investment. The city also is responsible for a $33
million loan from the state of Indiana due in 2000. The data in Table 2 identifies the annual
costs for the bonds negotiated for the city's investment.
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TABLE 4: PROJEcrs AND SouRcEs OF FuNDs FOR DowNTOwN
DEVELOPMENT IN PHOENIX
(IN MILLIONS)
Projects Year Source of Funds Total
State City Private
First Interstate Bank
Renovation
Bank of America
Renovation
Phoenix Museum of History
Downtown Streetscape
AT&T and US West
Phoenix Civic Plaza
Phoenix Newspapers
Abbey House Housing
Project
Orpheum Theatre
Arizona Science Center
Metropolitan Apartments
New Phoenix
Transportation Center
411 N. Central Building
AMC 24 Screen Theatre
Ball One Ballpark
Alice Cooper'stown
Restaurant
Holiday Inn Express Hotel
& Suites
Valley Youth Theatre
Embassy Suites
Civic Plaza Parking
Roosevelt Square Housing
Park at Arizona Center
Housing
Collier Center
Mariott at Collier Center
Phelps Dodge Center
TOTAL
PERCENT
40 40
9 9
9.5
8.8
15 15
31
35 35
8.8 8.8
14
48
10 10
1994
1995
1995
1996
1996
1996
1996
1997
1997
1997
1997
1997
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1999
2001
1999
1999
2000
2001
2001
55 514.5
2.9 27.5
2.7 2.7
8 8
7
52 52
43
75 75
1287.9
68.8
25
400
113
78
1871.4
2000]
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TABLE 5: HOUSEHOLD WEALTH BY REGION, 199623
Percent of Households With Disposable Incomes
Between
$75,000 and
Region $150,000 Above $150,000 Total Rank
Indianapolis 9.9 1.16 11.06 3
Cincinnati 10.3 1.33 11.63 1
Columbus 9.4 1.11 10.51 5
Dayton 9.1 0.90 10.0 7
Fort Wayne 7.5 0.84 8.34 9
Louisville 7.8 1.04 8.84 8
Minn./St. Paul 9.6 1.22 10.82 4
Milvaukee 9.1 1.11 10.21 6
St. Louis 10.1 1.29 11.39 2
TABLE 6
SALES TAX REvENUES GENERATED iN DowNTowN
PHOENIX BY BusmEss TYPE
24
Restaurants,
Year Bars Hotels, Motels Retail Total
Rate 1.3% 4.3% 1.3%
1991 $ 577,833 $ 808,698 $270,111 $1,656,642
1992 602,270 721,553 279,251 1,603,074
1993 695,613 785,293 344,150 1,825,056
1994 789,601 1,008,919 339,257 2,137,777
1995 806,963 1,105,665 309,789 2,222,417
1996 914,549 1,389,192 291,879 2,595,620
1997 930,476 1,411,185 291,527 2,633,188
1998 1,357,665 1,493,189 487,773 3,338,627
23. MARKET STATISTICS, INC.
24. City of Phoenix, Finance Dep't, Tax Division
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TABLE 7: CITY-WIDE SALES TAX RECEIPTS AND THE PROPORTION
FROM DowNTowN PHOENDIX
Citywide Sales Taxes Receipts By Activity and Year in Millions of Dollars
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Restaurants, Bars 12.0 12.7 13.3 15.5 16.8 18.2 19.4 21.0
Hotels and Motels 10.0 10.3 11.3 13.3 14.8 16.9 18.4 19.2
Retail 72.2 73.5 77.3 92.7 100.4 108.1 113.5 122.2
Total 94.2 96.5 101.9 121.6 132.0 143.2 151.3 162.5
Sales Taxes Collected Downtown as a Percentage of the Taxes Collected
Throughout Phoenix
Restaurants, Bars
Hotels, Motels
Retail
Total
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
4.8 4.8 5.2 5.1 4.8 5.0 4.8 6.5
8.1 7.0 7.0 7.6 7.5 8.2 7.7 7.8
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
1.8 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.7 2.1
25. Id.
2000]

